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Abstract 
According to prospects of international organisations like OECD and FAO, Ukraine will be one of the important 
suppliers of agricultural products on the world market in the coming decade. Thus, Ukrainian agricultural 
production and exports are important elements in sustaining global food security. However, the country threatens 
global food security as well as its own agricultural development when applying grain export restrictions, as 
happened several times in recent years. Therefore, any impediments to grain trade in the country should be 
carefully inspected. 
In this paper we analyse recent developments of Ukrainian agricultural policy influencing grain trade. We show 
that any export restriction brings large welfare losses compared to a free trade situation. We support our claim by 
a comparative analysis of the different export policies applied by the Ukrainian government on the domestic wheat 
market between 2006 and 2014. Additionally, we suggest and discuss alternative policy responses to realise the 
policy goal of domestic food security. As the policies applied, export tax, export quota and tax reimbursement, 
cannot be compared directly we quantify the tax equivalent of each trade policy measure. Under a set of specific 
assumptions the tax equivalent can be used to compare the effects of policies theoretically and empirically. 
Our findings go along with theory and show that export quotas in 2006 and in 2010 had a more restrictive effect on 
export than export taxes in 2011. Effects of non-reimbursement of VAT are very close to the effects of export tax in 
2011 (at the level of 9%), mainly because most of the time these two measures were implemented simultaneously. 
We also calculated tariff equivalent of VAT non-reimbursement excluding the period of export taxes. Based on 
these results, the measure corresponds to a slight decline of the tariff equivalent in absolute terms. 
As an alternative policy option for the Ukrainian government to respond more efficiently to increasing world 
market prices in the future it is advised to use consumer-oriented measures for the most vulnerable groups of 
people instead of distorting market mechanisms. 
Keywords: export restrictions, non-tariff barriers, Ukraine, wheat trade  
Iryna Kulyk and Thomas Herzfeld 
2 
 
1 Introduction 
Ukraine together with Russia and Kazakhstan and other Eastern European countries are seen as countries where 
large unrealized crop production and export potential exists. According to the new OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 
the above mentioned countries “collectively account for 51 % of the projected increase in cereal exports to 2022”. 
They will be an important supplier of agricultural products on the world market in the coming decade and thus 
sustain global food security (OECD/FAO, 2013). Therefore, any interventions in grain trade in these countries are 
carefully observed and discussed in the media all over the world. 
It is quite common among food exporting countries to implement export restrictions. According to Sharma (2011), 
during the period 2007 – March 2011 among 105 countries that used any sort of the food policy measures, 33 
countries restrained their exports at least once using various forms of restrictions (Sharma, 2011). A more recent 
study of Liapis (2013) shows that during 2002-2012 grains, oilseeds and vegetable oils were the most frequently 
targeted goods. Restrictions applied to cereals took place in the years of low harvest and price spikes on the world 
grain market. Ukraine applied grain export restrictions several times allegedly for domestic food security reasons. 
During the last decade Ukraine introduced various restrictive export measures, such as export licensing, export 
quotas and export taxes (Annex 1, Table 1). Since 2011/2012 MY grain traders and the government have signed the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), in the annexes to it they declare the upper limit for annual grain exports. 
In this paper we show that any export restriction brings large welfare losses compared to a free trade situation. 
We support our claim by a comparative analysis of the different export policies applied by the Ukrainian 
government on the domestic wheat market between 2006 and 2014. Additionally, we suggest and discuss 
alternative policy responses to realise the policy goal of food security. As the policies applied, export tax, export 
quota and tax reimbursement, cannot be compared directly we quantify the tax equivalent of each trade policy 
measure. Under a set of specific assumptions the tax equivalent can be used to compare the effects of policies 
theoretically and empirically. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section the current situation and development of the Ukrainian grain 
market will be summarized and main policy goals presented. After introducing the theoretical background in 
Section 2, we will present the results of the analysis in Section 3. Some policy recommendations will be presented 
in Section 5. 
1.1 Situation and development of the Ukrainian grain market since 2011  
Ukraine from time to time appears as a newsmaker with regards to its grain sector. It gets, on average, record 
harvests every two years. The year 2013/14 is not an exception. Starting from June 2013, the Ministry of Agrarian 
Policy and Food has declared that grain harvest will be around 53-54 million ton and that Ukraine will export half 
of it - around 24-26 million ton of grain1. Later the forecast was revised upwards several times and now we can say 
that the total grain harvest equalled 63 million tons, among them 22 million tons of wheat and 29 million tons of 
maize2.  Export of grains reached 32.9 million tons, among them 9.5 million tons of wheat, 2.5 million tons of 
barley and 20.5 million tons of corn3
On the contrary, the marketing year 2012/13 ended with the lowest wheat harvest for the past 6 years. Winter 
frosts and strong drought during the summer months had a negative influence on the crop yields. Thus, the 
production of wheat was 15.8 million tons. Despite the comparatively small harvest, exports of wheat reached 7.2 
million tons. 
.  
In 2011/12 MY the gross harvest was considerably higher than in the previous years, at the level of 56.7 million 
tons. This became possible mainly because of increased corn (22.8 million t) and wheat (22.3 million t) harvest. 
 
                                                 
1 http://minagro.gov.ua/uk/node/6903 
2 http://latifundist.com/novosti/45224-ukraina-postavit-na-vneshnie-rynki-333-mln-t-zerna--minekonomrazvitiya 
3 http://minagro.gov.ua/uk/node/13802  
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Table 1: Stocks to use ratio for wheat for the period from 2006/07 MY to 2013/14 MY 
Wheat Unit 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14 
Production mln t 14 13.9 25.9 20.9 16.8 22.3 15.8 22.3 
MY Imports mln t 0.1 0.3 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Total Supply mln t 16.5 15.6 28.1 24 19.2 25.7 21.2 25.0 
Total Domestic Consumption mln t 11.7 12.3 11.9 12.3 11.6 15 11.4 11.5 
MY Exports mln t 3.4 1.2 13 9.3 4.3 5.4 7.2 9.5 
Ending Stocks mln t 1.4 2.1 3.1 2.4 3.3 5.3 2.6 4.0 
Stocks/Use ratio % 9.3 15.6 12.4 11.1 20.8 26.2 14.0 19.0 
Source: Data from USDA reports 
Table 2: Stocks to use ratio for corn for the period from 2006/07 MY to 2013/14 MY 
Corn  Unit 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14 
Production mln t 6.4 7.4 11.4 10.5 11.9 22.8 20.9 30.9 
MY Imports mln t 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 
Total Supply mln t 7.5 8.6 12.2 11.4 12.5 23.8 21.9 32.0 
Total Domestic Consumption mln t 5.3 5.8 5.9 5.7 6.5 7.8 8.1 9.9 
MY Exports mln t 1 2.1 5.5 5.1 5 15.2 12.7 20.0 
Ending Stocks mln t 1.2 0.8 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.0 2.1 
Stocks/Use, % % 19.3 9.9 7.7 5.2 8.4 3.7 5.0 7.2 
Source: Data from USDA reports 
Table 3: Stocks to use ratio for barley for the period from 2006/07 MY to 2013/14 MY 
Barley  Unit 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14 
Production mln t 11.3 6 12.6 11.8 8.5 9.1 6.9 7.6 
MY Imports mln t 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Supply mln t 12.2 6.8 13.4 12.9 9.6 9.9 8.0 8.4 
Total Domestic Consumption mln t 6.3 5.0 5.9 5.6 6.0 6.3 5.1 5.1 
MY Exports mln t 5.1 1.0 6.4 6.2 2.8 2.5 2.1 2.5 
Ending Stocks mln t 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.1 0.8 0.8 
Stocks/Use ratio % 7.0 13.0 8.9 9.5 9.2 12.6 11.7 10.8 
Source: Data from USDA reports 
One common indicator of mid-term stable grain supply is the stocks-to-use ratio (SUR), defined as the sum of all 
uses divided by quantity in stock. Assuming rationally behaving stock managers, high SURs are expected to soften 
price spikes in case of shocks to production. International experience shows that global prices start to increase if 
world stocks to use ratios drop below 20 % for wheat and 12 % for maize (Bobenrieth et al., 2012). 
Domestic consumption of grain in Ukraine averages annually up to 26 million t, including around 12 million t of 
wheat, 6 million t of barley, 6 million t of corn and 2 million t of other cereals. Based on this demand, the export 
potential is estimated as a residual variable. In the best years it can amount up to 30 million t.  
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Out of around 12 million t of wheat for domestic consumption, 5.2 million t goes for human consumption, around 
1.6 million t of wheat is used for seeds, 4.1 million t is used for feed, processing into non-food products requires 
around 0.3 million t, losses amount to 0.4 million t4
Analysing price relations for major cereals reveals that since 2007 domestic producer prices are below the 
reference border price. As a consequence, Ukrainian grain producers measured by the Producer Subsidy 
Commodity Transfer (PSCT) are implicitly taxed and Ukrainian consumers measured by the Consumer Subsidy 
Commodity Transfer (CSCT) are implicitly subsidised. Another beneficiary of depressed domestic grain prices is the 
animal fattening sector which can rely on comparatively cheap feeding stuff.  
. 
Table 4: Transfers to producers and consumers for selected cereals (in mn UAH) 
Year Wheat Corn Barley 
 PSCT CSCT PSCT CSCT PSCT CSCT 
2006 -855.05 463.21 684.28 -222.91 12.74 63.83 
2007 -3,868.16 1,776.59 -160.72 59.79 -1,381.85 240.50 
2008 -11,842.08 4,519.45 -3,622.09 497.92 -3,514.04 382.33 
2009 -4,931.17 2,092.48 -354.64 37.84 -2,130.78 237.69 
2010 -1,524.98 724.08 -1,074.75 160.98 -422.28 59.75 
2011 -8,826.09 3,155.85 -9,525.42 711.51 -5,257.69 1,186.56 
2012 -7,969.47 3,561.58 -4,760.01 452.19 -3,460.03 684.64 
Source: OECD (2014) 
As annual data are not able to properly reflect the effect of single export policies lasting only for few months, in 
what follows we turn to higher frequency data. 
Figure 1: Producer and export prices for wheat in Ukraine, Rouen wheat prices (weekly data) 
Source: APK-Inform (2013), HGCA (2014) 
                                                 
4 Average numbers based on the grain balances developed by the working group of the Ministry of Economic Development and 
Trade of Ukraine. 
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Before analysing the effect of trade restrictions, the relationship between domestic and international grain prices 
needs to be inspected. In this study, we use soft wheat prices (class 1) FOB Rouen as indicator of a world market 
price. As shown by Figure 1, Ukrainian FOB prices and Rouen prices go along quite tight. Obviously, Ukraine is 
deeply integrated into the global agricultural markets and has to compete with other suppliers on the global 
market. Producer prices (EXW) also follow spikes and drops observed on the world market but they are not so 
pronounced as on the world market. The difference between producer prices and export prices can be partly 
explained by domestic transport and handling costs. The larger decoupling of Ukrainian prices from international 
wheat markets during times of export restrictions will be discussed more in detail further below.  
One important claim for the introduction of export restrictions has been the concern of food security and food 
price inflation. Therefore, we compare consumer prices of different processed grain products between 2007 and 
2013. As displayed by Figure 2, all bread prices follow an upward trend, although the implementation of the export 
restrictions should theoretically lead to the excess supply of wheat on domestic market and thus lower prices for 
Ukrainian consumers. But to explain rising bread prices despite the export restriction, additional research has to be 
done. One of the reasons might be the behaviour of traders, if they decide to keep grain in storages and to wait for 
better prices. Furthermore, bread prices are regulated by government policies and, thus, do not simply reflect 
market signals. Figures in Table 1 indicate that in marketing years 2007/08-2008/09 and 2010/11-2011/12 stocks 
increased significantly.  
Figure 2:  Average consumer prices for flour and bread in Ukraine 
 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine 
Jones and Kwiecinski (2010) analyse the impacts of the short-term restrictive measures of 10 different countries 
over the period 2006-2008 on the trade flows in and out of the domestic market to evaluate their effectiveness in 
meeting stated policy objectives. They found that by implementing grain quotas Ukraine limited export volumes 
but was not able to insulate the domestic market from the world price increases. Thus, consumers had to face 
rising prices while producers could not benefit from rising world prices. 
Goetz et al. (2013) investigate the influence of the export restrictions on market uncertainty in Ukraine. They 
conclude that instead of decreasing market uncertainty multiple governmental interferences have led to the 
increased market uncertainty and additional price volatility on the Ukrainian wheat market. Their findings are also 
supported by Liapis (2013) who suggests that frequent temporary measures not only contribute to market 
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instability both in the domestic and international markets but also “raise concerns about supplier reliability in 
import dependent countries that may last long beyond the duration of the policy”. 
Mitra and Josling (2009) show that export restrictions lead to a decrease in welfare, both in exporting and 
importing countries in the long as well as in the short run. The authors offer alternative measures to achieve food 
security, namely: raise agricultural production, use innovative supply strategies, implement domestic demand 
management measures, make bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations more effective and introduce, so 
called, “exporters’ code” (Mitra and Josling, 2009). 
Another reason for a less than theoretically expected price drop due to export restrictions might be that the 
middlemen (e.g. large mills) get the surplus. Djuric et al. (2012) find such an effect for Serbia. Wheat flour is not 
the only component in the cost structure of bread, it accounts for 40-47% of all costs5
To check whether the price increase was caused mainly by food price inflation or not, we calculated bread-to-flour 
price ratios. The development of this ratio presented in 
. Thus, increasing prices for 
other components while flour prices remain relatively stable may lead to higher bread prices. But Figure 2 reveals 
that the flour price also follows an upward trend. Another reason for the growing bread and flour prices despite 
the export restrictions could have been governmental purchases of wheat to state reserve. But the amount of 
purchases seems to be relatively small to affect the market. According to Agrarian Fund of Ukraine the 
governmental purchases of wheat equalled 772 thousand tons, 866 thousand tons, 624 thousand tons, and 773 
thousand tons in the years 2010 to 2013, which represents approximately 4 per cent of the quantity produced. 
Figure 3 reveals that during the period of export 
restrictions this ratio decreased. But whether this decrease is statistically significant, cannot be finally concluded. It 
also tells us that the prices for flour increased to a larger extent than bread prices. 
Figure 3: Bread-to-flour price ratio in Ukraine 
 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 http://ukrhlibprom.org.ua/ua/novini/richnij_zvit_2011.html, 2011 
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Figure 4: Price indices (monthly change) during 2005-2013 in Ukraine 
 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine 
1.2 Objectives of Ukrainian agricultural policy  
Laws and state programmes regulating the Ukrainian grain sector are framed by overarching goals of the 
agricultural policy. The most recent programmes are:  
• 2004 Law of Ukraine on state support of agriculture of Ukraine; 
• Law of Ukraine on grains and grain market in Ukraine; 
• Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On approval of the state targeted program for 
development of the Ukrainian countryside up to 2015"; 
• State program of the economic and social development of Ukraine for 2012 and main directions of 
development for 2013 and 2014; 
• State program for stimulation of economic development for 2013-2014. 
These laws and programmes set out a number of goals which agricultural policy should serve:  
• Ensuring food security,  
• Increase in production and export of grains,  
• Optimisation of the structure and efficiency of grain production  
• Price stability on the food market, and  
• Improvement of marketing infrastructure for agricultural products.  
A more detailed description of the laws is provided in Annex 2. 
1.3 Description of grain export policy measures 
Currently, grain export in Ukraine is more predictable due to the agreed amount of export in the Memorandum of 
Understanding. Previously the government applied different ad hoc export policy measures: Export quotas, export 
taxes, and export licensing. Another mechanism of grain market regulation is price intervention in the grain sector. 
The Agrarian Fund purchases grain for the state intervention fund and also provides grain pledge loans. 
Furthermore, the Agrarian Fund sells flour at defined prices to authorized bakeries to maintain low bread prices for 
“socially important” types of bread (OECD, 2013).  
90 
95 
100 
105 
110 
115 
120 
125 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
Ap
ril
 
Ju
ly
 
O
ct
ob
er
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
Ap
ril
 
Ju
ly
 
O
ct
ob
er
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
Ap
ril
 
Ju
ly
 
O
ct
ob
er
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
Ap
ril
 
Ju
ly
 
O
ct
ob
er
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
Ap
ril
 
Ju
ly
 
O
ct
ob
er
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
Ap
ril
 
Ju
ly
 
O
ct
ob
er
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
Ap
ril
 
Ju
ly
 
O
ct
ob
er
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
Ap
ril
 
Ju
ly
 
O
ct
ob
er
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
Ap
ril
 
Ju
ly
 
O
ct
ob
er
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Export restriction Consumer price index Food price index 
Bread price index Wheat flour price index 
Iryna Kulyk and Thomas Herzfeld 
8 
 
Most recent trade restrictions, except export duties, belong to the group of non-tariff trade measures. According 
to UNCTAD, “non-tariff measures are generally defined as policy measures other than ordinary customs tariffs that 
can potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing quantities traded, or prices or 
both” (UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2009/3). In what follows, we briefly summarise the various export policies and other 
requirements applied by the Ukrainian government over the last years. A full table with all measures and 
amendments is presented in Annex 1. 
Ad hoc measures 
Export licensing was introduced for wheat and wheat-rye mix in September 2006 and was into force until the end 
of December 2006. 
Grain export quotas were introduced in October 2006 and lasted, with some short breaks until May 2008. Export 
quotas were introduced again in October 2010 and lasted until the end of May 2011. In June, quotas were 
substituted by export taxes which were in force until mid-October 2011. Since October 10, 2011 export has been 
regulated by the informal agreement (MoU) between the government and grain traders. 
Ukrainian government, following the abolition of export quotas, introduced export duties in July 2011 for wheat at 
the level of 9 % (but not less than 17 EUR/ton), for barley at 14 % (but not less than 23 EUR/ton) and for maize at 
12% (but not less than 20 EUR/ton). The duties were planned to last until end of December 2011 but were 
abolished already earlier on October 7, 2011. 
Since export duties imposed at the beginning of the season seriously diminished the rate of shipment of grain, 
Ukraine could not realize its export potential fully and export of wheat in 2011 amounted to 4.1 million tons 
(UCAB, 2012). In 2012, export of wheat was more than two times larger than in 2011 (8.7 million tons). During 
2013, Ukraine exported 7.8 million tons of wheat. During the first four months of 2014 Ukraine exported 1.5 
million tons of wheat (Ministry of Revenue and Duties of Ukraine; Global Trade Atlas, accessed on 23.07.2014). 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
The Memorandum of Understanding is a relatively new regulation mechanism on the grain market of Ukraine. It 
was first signed between the representatives of grain exporters and producers and the Ministry of Agricultural 
Policy and Food in October 2011. The levels of grain export mentioned in the MoU are discussed and should be 
agreed till September of each year, taking into account existing grain stocks and expected grain crop, and might be 
revised through the marketing year. The MoU enforces the position of grain traders already engaged in 
international markets but might prevent competition from market entrants. 
According to the Memorandum traders must provide the Ministry with data on exported amount of grain every 
week; the Ministry on a weekly basis provides traders with aggregated data on the exported volumes of grain and 
informs them how much can be still exported. 
If export reached 80% of the “agreed” level, the Ministry could “review” conditions of trade (OECD, 2013). A 
notification about termination of the grain export should be sent to all exporters not later than two months before 
its introduction.  
For the marketing year 2011/2012, export volume for wheat was restricted to 10.5 million tons. In 2012/2013 MY, 
export limits were revised several times with a final limit for wheat at 6.6 million tons, 12.4 million tons for maize, 
and 3.0 million tons for barley. The Memorandum has been signed again for 2013/2014 MY. 
VAT reimbursement 
The mechanism of VAT taxation and VAT refund is well described by Kuhn and Nivievskyy (IER, 2004). Zero rate 
VAT is used to avoid double-taxation both in the country of exports and the country of imports. In the cases when 
VAT on export operation is not refunded, it equals to an ad-valorem tax which has to be paid by the exporter.  
The situation on VAT refund in Ukraine varied from year to year as displayed in Table 5: 
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Table 5: VAT refund rules for grain 2005-2014 
Years VAT regime 
2005-2006 VAT refund regime was in force but there were problems with the actual payments to the 
traders (reported considerable VAT refund arrears) 
August 2006 Discussions about stopping the reimbursement of VAT 
2006-2008 VAT reimbursement regime is in force, but there are payment delays and payments made 
fractionally 
February 2009- 
December 2009 
The VAT was returned not in money form but in the form of grain from the Agrarian Fund of 
Ukraine 
February 2010 The Agricultural Minister says about resumption of the VAT refund through the Agrarian Fund 
in the form of grain 
May 2010 It is approved that the VAT refund will be carried out through issue of domestic treasury bonds 
but the issue took place only in September 2010 
Since July 1, 
2011 
Grain export have been exempted from VAT until January 1, 2014 
October 20, 2011 0% VAT approved by the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine, meaning that VAT refund 
regime comes into force 
November 4, 
2011 
President vetoed the Law on 0% tax adopted in October, so the previous regime of exemption 
from VAT came into force again 
December 19, 
2013 
The Law on Amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine regarding several taxes  
№ 713-VII of 19.12.2013 came into force on January 1, 2014. According to this law the VAT has 
to be reimbursed since January 1, 2014 if the grain is exported by grain producers, produced at 
the lands which they own or permanently use at the date of the export or if the grain is 
exported by the companies which bought the grain directly from such grain producers. 
March 27, 2014 The Law of Ukraine on Prevention of the Financial Disaster and Creation conditions for 
Economic Growth in Ukraine № 1166-VII says that temporarily, till October 1, 2014, grain 
export is exempted from VAT, except of the export of grain by agricultural enterprises, 
produced on the agricultural land that they own or permanently use at the date of the export.  
 
The policy of VAT exemption has a negative impact on producers, because traders decrease their purchasing 
prices. Traders purchase the goods from producers with VAT, though it cannot be deducted due to absence of 
taxable revenue, in this way VAT increases the goods cost (Otten, 2012). 
Certification 
To be able to export grain from Ukraine traders have to provide several certificates. The most important is the 
Phytosanitary certificate (State Veterinary and Phytosanitary Service of Ukraine) which is regulated by the Law 
#3348-XII “On the Plant Quarantine” of 30.06.1993. The procedure of issuance of the phytosanitary certificate was 
approved by the Decree #705 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 12.05.2007. The decision about granting 
the certificate may take up to 5 days, the certificate is valid for 14 days. 
The Quarantine Certificate (State Veterinary and Phytosanitary Service of Ukraine) is relevant for domestic 
movement of grain and is regulated by the Law #3348-XII “On the Plant Quarantine” of 30.06.1993. The procedure 
of issuance of the quarantine certificate was approved by the Decree #705 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
on 12.05.2007. The decision about granting the certificate may take up to 5 days, the certificate is valid for 14 days. 
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This certificate is obligatory when the parcel was transported from the zones where the presence of pests under 
quarantine control is declared only.  
Phytosanitary and quarantine rules were inherited from the USSR and then changed, so they are in force for a long 
time. On 23.08.2005, the Ministry of Agricultural Policy of Ukraine issued the Order #414 with “The rules of import, 
transportation within the country, transit, export, processing and trade of the goods under quarantine control”.  
1) Veterinary certificate for fodder grain (State Veterinary and Phytosanitary Service of Ukraine) falls under 
regulation of the Article 32, Chapter IV and Chapter XII of Law of Ukraine #2498-XII “On Veterinary 
Medicine” of 25.06.1992. The procedure of issuance of the veterinary certificate was approved by the 
Order #85 of the State Committee of Veterinary Medicine of Ukraine on 13.04.2009. The decision about 
granting the certificate may take up to one month. It should be issued not earlier than 72 hours before 
loading the goods into transport for export. 
2) Certificate of use of pesticides and agricultural chemicals in agricultural products and raw materials of 
plant origin (State Veterinary and Phytosanitary Service of Ukraine) is regulated by the Law of Ukraine 
# 180-XIV of 14.10.1998 
Until recently grain traders also had to provide quality certificate for grain and products processed of it. The 
decision about granting the certificate could take up to 3 days. The quality check of grain was made at least twice: 
once at the elevator before loading for transportation to the port and the second time during custom clearance 
when re-loaded to the ship. Moreover, if one grain parcel was transported to the port by two trucks, there should 
be two certificates - one for each vehicle.  
“On Plant Protection”. The procedure of issuance of the certificate is regulated by 
the Decree #1378 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted on 28.12.2011. The decision about 
granting the certificate may take up to 10 days. 
Certificate of the storage services for grain and products of its processing was also recently abolished. This 
procedure had to be fulfilled each year, although market players lobbied to make it for unrestricted period of time.  
Abolishment of an obligatory grain certification allows grain producers and traders to save costs during the 
transaction and decreases incentives for corruption. This is an important step in facilitation of the grain trade since 
it decreases waiting time of the rail-cars and other transport; that makes the use of transport more efficient. 
Before the abolition of those certificates Ukrainian Grain Association reported that according to the data of 
Ukrzaliznytsya, a grain rail-car was on the way only 15 % of the time, the rest of the time it was either loaded or 
unloaded or was waiting for the documents. Moreover, 50 % of the idle time was due to the delayed issue of the 
grain quality certificate6
2 Theoretical analysis 
. 
Welfare analysis of agricultural policy shows the changes in welfare measures of the stakeholders, like producers, 
consumers, and taxpayers. Welfare measures can be used to assess the effects of a policy or to compare different 
policy instruments. Using social welfare analysis, we will show the effect of and compare across different policy 
instruments on producers, consumers and the government budget. We use a partial equilibrium approach to show 
the effect of export policies on the wheat market, but we do not consider the consequences for other markets. It is 
true that export restrictions might also indirectly affect factor markets (e.g. labour, land, transportation services, 
etc.) as well as other agricultural markets (e.g. oilseeds, fattening) but these effects and interactions between the 
markets are ignored in partial equilibrium setting (Tirole, 1994). 
Kuznetsova (2007) notes that the impact of the export restrictions on the economy will be different depending on 
the “model assumptions” such as small or large country case, long or short term effect of the observed restrictions, 
static or dynamic framework and exchange rate regime.  
In this paper we will present short-term effects of export taxes, export quotas and VAT reimbursement policies for 
both scenarios: Assumption of a ‘large country’ with effects on the formation of world market prices and the 
                                                 
6 http://latifundist.com/novosti/43795-vnutrennyaya-sertifikatsiya-zerna-znachitelno-utrudnyaet-logistiku--ekspert 
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assumption of a ‘small country’ without effects on world market prices. The practical relevance of the assumption 
might differ from period to period and will depend on the import market to be analysed.  
Generally, Ukraine’s share on the world wheat market reached sometimes around 10 per cent (in 2008/09). 
Because the export restrictions were introduced simultaneously by at least two countries of the RUK region, it is 
hard to distinguish whether disruptions in supply to the world market and subsequent price reactions happened 
due to restriction in Ukraine or in Russia and Kazakhstan, the other big suppliers of wheat on the world market. For 
example in 2007/08 MY, both Ukraine and Russia restricted their exports in the form of quotas and taxes, 
respectively. By the end of that marketing year Kazakhstan introduced an export ban on wheat.  
2.1 Export tax 
In a case of Ukraine, the export tax was used as a measure to avoid threats to domestic food security. 
Furthermore, trade taxes were used frequently as an important source of government revenues in the early 
history of developed countries (Corden, 1997). 
Between June and October 2011, the export tax for wheat was implemented as an ad valorem tariff of 9 per cent 
subject to a minimum amount of EUR 17 per ton. As wheat prices did not fall below EUR 189 during the period of 
application, the minimum amount has always been surpassed. Therefore, we concentrate on the ad valorem tax 
below. 
Implementing the export tax will reduce export supplies as quantities close to the margin will lose competitiveness 
on the world market. As a direct consequence domestic supply of wheat will increase. Producers cannot adjust 
their level of production in the short-run and we assume post-harvest aggregated supply of wheat to be fixed. In 
this analysis we exclude the cost of storage to illustrate the mechanism how taxes and quota work. The export tax 
will increase the costs of Ukrainian wheat on the world market, represented by a shift of the export supply curve 
(ES) to ES´ in Figure 5. As a result Ukrainian wheat exports will fall from Qw to Qw´. Whenever demand on 
international markets (Id) is not perfectly price elastic (i.e. assuming a large exporter), the world market price will 
increase from Pw to Pw´. Thus, the tax burden will be distributed between exporters [(Pw - P
D
w)*Qw´
 ] and 
international consumers [(Pw´ - Pw)*Qw´]. Due to the increased domestic supplies domestic prices will go down up 
to the point where domestic demand equals supply less exports (Qd
 
´).  
Figure 5: Effects of an export tax on Ukrainian and world market  
The new level of exports is the distance Qd'Qs and the government gains by collecting export tax revenues 
described by the rectangle DFGH (before adjustment of the world market price). The gain in domestic consumer 
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surplus is Pd´PdIH. The loss in domestic producer surplus is PdFGPd
In the medium-term, which is not shown on the 
´. The deadweight loss here is the triangle IDH. If 
the loss triangle IDH is smaller than the rectangle DCEF, which is an incoming transfer from the importing country 
which partly “pays” the export tax, the exporting country can benefit from the implementation of the export tax. 
Kuznetsova (2007) shows that the possible income for the exporting country grows the lower the elasticity of 
supply and demand in the importing country (i.e., rest of the world) and the more elastic supply and demand of 
the exporting country. To be clear, such a terms of trade effect can only appear in case of a large exporter. 
Figure 5, the terms of trade will result in another upward price 
adjustment on the domestic market. However, compared to a free trade scenario the depressed domestic price 
will reduce incentives for producers and will result in lower wheat production in the future. 
From a point of view of a trader an export tax is just like an additional cost of transportation. Thus traders decrease 
their buying price by the amount of tariff in order to remain competitive at the world market. 
 
Figure 6: Effects of an export tax on Ukrainian and world market (small country case) 
In a small country case after implementation of the export tax the domestic price will go down up to the level of 
the world market price (Pw) minus export tax. Quantity supplied to the domestic market increases and the level of 
exports declines by QdQd'. The government gains by collecting export tax revenue described by the rectangle 
DFGH. The gain in domestic consumer surplus is Pd'PdIH. The loss in domestic producer surplus is PdFGPd
2.2 Export quota  
'. The 
deadweight loss for the economy is the triangle IDH. 
After the introduction of a quota the export is restricted to the amount Qd'Qs (equals 0Qw’ on the export market). 
Assuming a short-run perfectly inelastic total supply, the introduction if a binding quota will result in an increased 
supply to the domestic market by QdQd'. Subsequently, the domestic price will drop to Pd' resulting in an increase 
in domestic consumption. The loss in domestic producer revenue is Pd'PdBD, the gain in domestic consumer 
surplus is Pd'PdCD, and summing up these effects we obtain a net welfare loss DCB on the domestic market. 
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Figure 7: Effects of an export quota on Ukrainian and world market (large country case) 
The effect of the export quota on the world market is similar to that of the export taxes. As soon as the quota is 
fulfilled the export supply curve becomes perfectly price inelastic. In case of a price elastic demand and a binding 
quota, the world market price will increase if the economy under consideration represents a large exporter.  
Looking at the distribution of the additional export revenues, exporters or governments benefit depending on the 
quota’s implementation. In case of distribution for free, exporters are the main beneficiaries. The administration of 
the quota in 2006 was reported to be highly non-transparent, and thus created opportunities for corruption (von 
Cramon, IER, 2006). In 2010/2011, export quotas were implemented on short notice, and their distribution came 
along with massive corruption. “The majority of the export licenses were distributed to a state owned company in 
2010. Foreign grain trading companies did not receive any export licenses unless they paid bribes and thus 
experienced high economic losses due to foregone exports” (Götz, Goychuk, 2013).  
 
Figure 8: Effects of an export quota on Ukrainian market (small country case) 
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In the case of a small country the effects are very similar, except the reaction of world market prices. By imposing a 
quota government restricts export to the distance Qd'Qs, thus increasing domestic supply. As a result, the 
domestic price drops to Pd'. Producer surplus decreases by Pd'PdAF. If there is no licensing of exports, then 
exporters will earn the amount of area DBAF. Finally, consumers gain the surplus indicated by the area Pd'Pd
2.3 VAT reimbursement 
CD. 
Summing up all these effects, results in a deadweight loss of the amount of the triangle DCB.  
In the case of “zero VAT” prices for traders and farms should be equal Pt = Pf
Let’s have a look at the situation when export VAT is not reimbursed. Traders buy grain from farmers with VAT. But 
since export is exempted of VAT reimbursements, exporters cannot claim for VAT refund which they paid to the 
farmer. Therefore, to remain competitive on the world market an exporter has to offer a lower price to the farmer.  
, because VAT paid is reimbursed 
afterwards. Here we don’t take into account claims that VAT was usually only partially reimbursed. 
Below we depict the situation graphically. When there is no reimbursement of VAT, it has the same effect as an ad-
valorem export tax. Traders buy less wheat because export becomes less attractive, price paid by the trader goes 
up to Pt' and the price received by the farmers goes down to Pf'. Given a reimbursement for domestically sold 
wheat, domestic supply will increase and is expected to result in lower prices for domestic end consumers. 
However, the export supply curve will shift upwards resulting in a lower exported quantity (e.g. from Qw to Qw
 
’) 
which will be sold at a higher price.  
 
Figure 9: Effects of the exemption of VAT policy (large country case)  
The effects on the traders and producers depend on the large country assumption. In case of a small country, the 
whole burden of the VAT exemption lies on the farmers and they receive a price net off the amount of VAT (Figure 
10). If a large country is assumed and the world market price would react, then both traders and farmers share the 
burden (Figure 9).  
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Figure 10: Effects of the exemption of VAT policy (small country case)  
A short summary of the effects of the different export restrictions in Ukraine is presented in Table 6. Obviously, the 
observed price development masks at least two effects: The reaction of domestic prices to changes in international 
quotations and the effect of Ukrainian trade policies on domestic prices. It is almost impossible to determine what 
would have happened without the trade restriction as counterfactuals are missing. Referring back to the PSCT and 
CSCT measures published by the OECD suggests that the gap between domestic and international grain prices 
increased from 2006 to 2008 and from 2010 to 2011 (Table 4). 
Table 6: Theoretical and observed effects of export restrictions in Ukraine 
Effect on Theoretical effects Observed gross effects while measure in place 
Export quota Export tax Non-
reimbursed 
VAT 
Export quota Export tax 
Non-reimbursed VAT 
Producer 
price 
     
Consumer 
price 
     
Quantity 
exported 
     
World 
market price 
     
Note: Bread prices rose in absolute levels during the period of export restriction but the ratio of bread to flour 
prices went down.  
3 Results of the empirical analysis 
To have a base of comparison for all three measures, we will calculate tax equivalents of the grain market policies 
applied by the Ukrainian government.  
A change in exported quantity resulting from a change of the world market price is determined by the elasticity of 
export supply η: 
η  = - (∆Qx/Qx)/(∆Pw/Pw).       (1) 
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Here, Qx
In a free market case the world market price is equal to the domestic price plus transaction costs, which are 
neglected in this analysis. 
 denotes the average monthly export volume in the base period and ∆Qx is the change of the exported 
quantity. 
Pw ≥ Pd         
In case of export tariffs in place the world market price should be at least equal to the domestic price times the 
tariff rate (1+t): 
(2) 
Pw' ≥ (1+t)Pd
Using the Equations 2 and 3 and assuming a strict equality of domestic and world market prices we can derive the 
following expression: 
        (3) 
∆Pw/Pw = (Pw' - Pw)/ Pw  = [(1+t)Pd – Pd]/ Pd
To calculate the tariff equivalent of quota, we substitute ∆P
 = t    (4) 
w/Pw
η = - (∆Q
 in the first equation by t and we get: 
x/Qx
Rearranging (5) gives an expression to calculate the export tariff equivalent for other policy instruments, which we 
will use for our further analysis. 
)/t        (5) 
t = - (∆Qx/Qx
As our base period we us average export per month in 2009/10 MY which amounts to 763077.50 tons of wheat. 
We will compare all the measures to this base period by calculating hypothetical tariff equivalents for export 
quota, export taxes and VAT non-reimbursement policy. 
)/η        (6) 
Due to the absence of recent estimates of export supply elasticities for Ukrainian grain export, we based our 
assumed export elasticity of 0.5 on earlier estimates for the US (Koo, 1984). The value is close to other estimates 
reported by Haniotis et al. (1988) for the US. Any other export elasticity will affect the size of the effects in a linear 
way but not the direction and the comparison across the three measures. Results of a simulation over different 
elasticity values are presented in Annex 3. 
Export quotas were in force since October 2006 till May 2008 and since October 4, 2010 to May 25, 2011 (8 
months). Average monthly export of wheat during the quota regime was 105880.7 tons and 262056.8 tons, 
respectively. 
Export tax period started in June 2011 and lasted until October 7, 2011. We took into account only full months and 
the average monthly export during June-September 2011 was 587440.5 tons. 
VAT on exports has not been reimbursed since July 1, 2011 until January 1, 2014. Average monthly export of wheat 
during this period was 630938.1 tons. 
We also calculated a tariff equivalent for VAT non-reimbursement policy for the period after abolition of the 
export tax, since October 2011 to January 1, 2014. Average monthly export of wheat during this period was 
643839.6 tons. 
Table 7: Tariff equivalent of export quotas, duties and VAT non-reimbursement policies 
Average monthly wheat export in base period (2009/10 MY) [t] 763077.50 
 
Qx ∆Q [t] x t  [t] 
Quota October 2006- May 2008 105880.65 -657196.85 1.72 
Quota October 2010- May 2011 262056.75 -501020.75 1.31 
Export tax (simultaneous with cancelled VAT refund) 587440.50 -175637.00 0.46 
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VAT non-reimbursement July 2011-December 2013 630938.07 -132139.43 0.35 
VAT non-reimbursement after abolition of export tax 643839.63 -119237.87 0.31 
 
We compared all policy measures related to wheat export in Ukraine to 2009/10 MY. Our results confirm that 
quotas in 2006 and in 2010 had more restrictive effect on export than export taxes in 2011. Effects of non-
reimbursement of VAT are very close to the effects of export tax in 2011 (at the level of 9 %), but here we have to 
mention that most of the time these two measures were implemented simultaneously. Therefore, we also 
calculated tariff equivalent of VAT non-reimbursement excluding the period of export taxes (from October 2011 till 
January 1, 2014). Because of that we can see slight decline of the tariff equivalent in absolute terms from 0.35 to 
0.31. 
Some cautionary remarks have to be made. First, our results heavily depend on the choice of the base year to 
compare with. For any year where exported quantities have been very low, the tariff equivalent might even turn 
positive. For example, if we consider year 2005 as our reference year, then in the case of export taxes and VAT-
non-reimbursement policy, we don’t see a negative sign of the tariff equivalent. Such a result does not imply that 
these policies increased Ukrainian exports from the country. Second, we should also keep in mind that export 
volumes depend not only on the policy instruments implemented but also on the grain harvest in a specific year. 
Finally, also macroeconomic conditions might affect domestic and international demand and result, subsequently, 
in higher or lower than “normal” exports. However, there is no “natural” export quantity of Ukraine. Thus, any 
base year should ideally represent an average harvest, an average domestic market situation and an average world 
market situation in the absence of any policy measure restricting exports. 
4 Conclusions and discussion 
Based on the theoretical analysis it has been shown that although consumers might benefit from export 
restrictions, overall welfare of the country decreases when export restrictions are introduced. But as we can see in 
the case of Ukraine, theoretical results have to be put into the context of the situation. In the recent years, 
domestic prices for wheat, flour and bread kept growing during export restrictions. 
There can be several reasons for increasing consumer prices: 
- Traders and producers, committed to export, don’t expect stable agricultural trade policy. They might 
keep more grain in stocks and wait for better prices or they find the ways to export instead of supplying to 
the domestic market.  
- Millers and other processors exert their market power and capture the benefits from the export 
restriction. 
- Government buys out (too much) grain to the state reserves and, thus, exaggerates market reactions. 
The results of our empirical analysis show that export taxes in 2011 were less distorting than export quotas in 
2006-2008 and 2010-2011. During the export tax regime, signals from the world market will be still transmitted on 
the domestic market and traders can react to them. 
With regard to the MoU we can identify the following effects:  
- The rules for new entrants are not transparent. New traders might increase competition and might introduce 
technical progress. Both aspects would potentially reduce margins of traders and could benefit farmers and 
consumers.  
- There is uncertainty regarding the changing limits of the “allowed” export. From the perspective of potential 
importers of Ukrainian grain, several revisions of the limits are not favourable to the image of Ukraine as a reliable 
partner. Obviously, statements of the governmental officials that the limit is approaching and there could be 
measures (like an export ban) implemented, may raise uncertainty on the market and might cause price 
fluctuations. 
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Any type of restrictions lead to welfare losses to economy, therefore free trade is the best scenario. While the 
argument has been often made that consumers will suffer from free trade, we will illustrate such a situation here. 
Under the assumption of complete absence of barriers to grain exports and homogeneity of Ukrainian grain, 
exports from Ukraine will increase as soon as prices abroad net of transport costs exceed domestic prices. 
Increasing export activity will result in increasing domestic prices. Obviously, in the welfare economic setting above 
farmers will benefit from such a situation and consumers will experience a declining welfare. However, such a 
static effect neglects a number of adjustment processes. In the short-run, grain will be released from stores and 
economically less valuable uses of grain will look for substitutes. Subsequently, the additional quantity available on 
the market will constrain a further increase of prices. At the same time, more expensive Ukrainian grain will be less 
competitive on the world market. Thus, demand for Ukrainian exports from abroad should decline, too. An 
important long-run consequence will be the incentive for farmers to increase grain production in the next season. 
If we relax the assumption of homogenous grain quality, there will be even more opportunities for substitution of 
higher quality (more expensive) wheat with lower quality wheat which additionally will buffer the transmission of 
increasing world market prices to the Ukrainian consumers. Thus, price spikes which harm consumers might 
appear in the short-run but cannot last, under the assumptions stated above, more than a few months. Here the 
Ukrainian government should focus their policy in helping the most vulnerable consumers directly instead of 
distorting market mechanisms. 
The analysis presented above has to be interpreted carefully. While the ranking of tariff equivalents is unaffected 
by the underlying assumptions, the size varies conditional on the size of the export supply elasticity and the 
assumed quantity reduction. The tariff equivalents represent a gross measure and could be further decomposed in 
effects due to changes in world market prices and the pure policy effect.  
5 Policy recommendations 
The Ukrainian policy of export restrictions over the last years does not had the desired effect on the consumer 
prices and does not solve the issue of food security, therefore the government should avoid from implementing 
ad-hoc measures in future. Every intervention brings uncertainty to the market that might result in increased 
volatility of prices. As an alternative policy option for the Ukrainian government to respond more efficiently to 
increasing world market prices in the future it is advised to use consumer-oriented measures for the people in 
need, for example, direct income transfers.  
One example of unintended cross-effects of an unstable agricultural policy is the disincentive to store grain. Price 
stability could be easily enhanced by a transparent and predictable market environment. Storage fulfils a crucial 
function in this respect. However, storage only pays if the policy environment is stable and managers are assured 
of being able building up expectations over the near future.  
Restoration of VAT refund will increase farm prices and income, will give an incentive to farmers to increase grain 
production or invest in more efficient technology. Since the domestic grain consumption is relatively stable, the 
increased production will lead to increased exports. 
In our opinion, the role of the government in the market should be mainly to ensure equal rights to all market 
participants and eliminate incentives for corruption. It is advised to facilitate trade and do not create additional 
administrative barriers, like grain quality certification. Especially, government can support market development by 
increasing transparency. Therefore, it is suggested to the Ukrainian government to put more efforts and resources 
into the improvement of state agricultural statistics, including the development of a reliable operational 
monitoring system for grain balance. 
 
The following key recommendations aim at supporting the development of a more competitive grain market while 
at the same time realising food security for the most vulnerable households: 
1) Stop the practice of unannounced official and unofficial export restrictions. This could be done by 
amending the Law of Ukraine ‘On State Support to Agriculture’. 
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2) Design and introduce a set of indicators to monitor food security in the country. This could be achieved by 
drafting the Law of Ukraine ‘On Food Security’, whereby introduction of export restrictions should be 
contingent on specific indicators/thresholds.  
3) Decrease grain marketing costs by reviewing marketing regulations in the grain value chain, from inputs to 
export markets. This requires a comprehensive approach and revision of the legal framework of 
functioning seeds, agrichemicals, agrimachinery, grain storage and transport logistics, and bioengineering 
products markets; this also concerns phytosanitary measures as well as some sanitary measures.   
4) Design safety nets for the poor to compensate them for bread prices increases; and shift to targeted food 
support system.  
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Annex 1: Grain export restrictions in Ukraine during the last decade 
Year Amount/ duration Regulating Document 
September  2006 Export licensing introduced for wheat and 
wheat-rye mix until December 31, 2006 
Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine №1364 of September 28, 
2006  
October 2006 Export quotas introduced wheat 400 000 
tons,  
maize 600 000 tons,  
barley 600 000 tons,  
rye 3 000 tons until December 31, 2006 
Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine  № 1418 of October 11, 2006 
December 2006 New quotas for Jan-June 2007  Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine  № 1852 of December 29,  
2006 
February 2007 New quotas until June 2007 wheat 
reduced to 228 000 tons, 
maize 30 000 tons,  
barley 606 000 tons 
Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine  N 185 of February 13, 2007  
February 2007 Quotas cancelled for maize and barley Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine N 290 of February 22, 2007  
May 2007  Quotas cancelled for wheat Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine N 748 of May 16, 2007 
June 2007  Quotas re-introduced for Jan-Oct 07 
wheat 3 000 tons,  
maize 3 000 tons,  
barley 3 000 tons 
Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine N 844 of June 20, 2007  
September-October 2007  Quota regime extended to end 2007 
 
Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine N 1179 of September 26, 
2007  
Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine N 1287 of October 31, 2007  
December 2007  Quotas announced for Jan-March 2008, 
substantially raised  
wheat 200 000 tons,  
maize 600 000 tons,  
barley 400 000 tons 
Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine N 1411 of December 29, 2007 
March 2008 Export quotas extended to April for wheat 
and barley  
wheat 200 000 tons,  
barley 400 000 tons 
Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine N 271 of March 28, 2008 
March 2008 Quotas abolished for maize from April 
(but license required) 
Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine N 271 of March 28, 2008 
April 2008  Quotas for wheat and barley substantially 
raised (until July 2008) 
wheat 1 200 000 tons,  
barley 900 000 tons 
Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine N 418 of April 23, 2008 
May 2008  Quotas and licensing abolished Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine  N 470 of May 21, 2008 
2009-10 MY (July-August) Grain policies relatively liberal with no 
export bans or restrictions 
 
October 2010  Quotas set for until end-2010 
wheat 0.5 mln tons,  
Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine N 938 of October 4, 2010 
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maize 2mln tons, 
barley 200 000 tons  
December 2010 Wheat 1 mln tons, 
maize 3 mln tons and 
barley 200 000 tons 
extended to 31st of March 2011 
Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine N 1182 of December 6, 2010 
March 2011  Wheat 1 mln tons, 
maize 5 mln tons and  
barley 200 000 tons 
extended quota for all grains to until end 
of June 2011 
Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine  N 337 of March 30, 2011 
April 2011 Quotas cancelled for maize Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine  N 463 of April 27, 2011 
May 2011 Quotas abolished for wheat and barley Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine  N 566 of May 25, 2011 
June 2011 Introduced export taxes until January 1, 
2012 
Wheat – 9% but not less than EUR 17/ton 
Barley – 14% but not less than EUR 23/ton 
Maize – 12% but not less than EUR 20/ton 
Law of Ukraine № 3387-VI “On 
amendments to the Tax Code of 
Ukraine and the rates of export duties 
on certain cereals” of 19.05.2011  
October 2011 Export taxes abolished for wheat and 
maize but remain effective for barley 
Law of Ukraine № 3906-17 On 
Amending the Law of Ukraine "On 
Amendments to the Tax Code of 
Ukraine and the rates of export duties 
on certain cereals" of 07.10.2011 
October 2011 MoU between Government and grain 
traders signed, valid until July 1, 2012 
regulating export volumes 
Wheat – 10.5 mln tons 
Maize – 10.5 mln tons 
Barley – 3.5 mln tons 
Rye – 40 000 tons 
Memorandum of Understanding on 
Grain Exports of October 10, 2011 
September 2012 MoU between Government and traders 
extended for 2012/2013 MY 
Wheat – 4 mln tons (limit increased to 6.6 
mln tons) 
Maize – 12.4 mln tons 
Barley – 3 mln tons 
Amendments to MoU of 31.07.2012 
 
Annex to Memorandum of 
Understanding on Grain Exports of 
September 3, 2012 
2013 MoU between Government and grain 
exporters signed for  2013/14 MY 
Memorandum of Understanding on 
Grain Exports of June 19, 2013 
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Annex 2: Description of laws regulating grain market 
Law of Ukraine on Grains and grain market in Ukraine 
Purposes 
• ensuring food security; 
• ensuring favourable investment, credit, tax and customs policy for the formation of the grain market; 
• optimization of the structure and efficiency of grain production; 
• ensure that the grain market is functioning on the basis of a combination of competition and government 
regulation to balance the interests of business and the state; 
• state control over the quality of the grain, its products and high-quality seeds; 
• stabilize the grain market; 
• increase the export potential of the grain market; 
• implementing government mortgage purchases; 
• implementing state agricultural intervention; 
• determine the order of export and import of grain and its products according to international treaties. 
 
How the goals will be achieved 
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine regulates the grain market through: 
• government mortgage purchases; 
• formation of government food grain reserves; 
• funding for the Agrarian Fund; 
• certification services to store grain and its products; 
• pricing on the grain market and risk insurance to the subjects on the grain market; 
• mechanism of export and import of grain and its products under international agreements; 
• monitoring of the grain that is stored and also grain that is stored in private or leased granaries; 
• monitoring of the grain market; 
• customs and tariff policy; 
• development and refinement of the grain balances; 
• funding for research and plant breeding and seed production; 
• financial support to seed producers, research institutions; 
• partial compensation to agricultural producers for purchased seed of high reproduction; 
• forward purchases to the state grain reserves; 
• imposition of temporary price controls; 
• providing temporary fiscal subsidies. 
 
Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On Approval of the State Targeted Program for Development of the 
Ukrainian Countryside up to 2015" 
Purposes 
The aims of the Program are creation of favorable conditions for solving complex social problems of rural areas 
and rural development, creating highly competitive agricultural sector in domestic and foreign markets, food 
security, increase in income of the rural population, conservation Ukrainian peasantry as a carrier of cultural 
identity and spirituality. 
 
State program of the economic and social development of Ukraine for 2012 and main directions of development for 
2013 and 2014 
Purposes 
- create a more suitable environment for doing business by establishing the rule of law in practice, reducing state 
intervention in the economy, improve the tax system, establish public-private partnerships and create effective 
incentives for investors; 
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- competitiveness of domestic goods and services, increase their exports and create opportunities for import 
substitution. 
The following tasks need to perform for the development of agriculture, forestry and food security: 
- create conditions for rural and agricultural development through the implementation of the State target program 
for development of Ukrainian village until 2015; 
- ensure price stability in the food market and ensure food security through the formation of the state intervention 
fund by the Agrarian Fund; 
- increase of competitive livestock production by stimulating the construction and repair of livestock farms and 
complexes, animal feed manufacturers by partial compensation for the cost of such facilities, payment of budget 
grants for the sold milk, cheap credits, compensation for purchasing milking machines; 
- technical and technological re-equipment of agriculture, including the provision of state support to agricultural 
service cooperatives to purchase agricultural machinery and equipment of Ukrainian production; 
- geographical expansion of markets for agricultural products. 
 
State program for stimulation of economics development for 2013-2014 
The main problems to deal with in the years 2013 - 2014: 
-  outdated equipment in the agricultural sector and non- compliance of the agricultural enterprises with agri-
environmental norms; 
- underdeveloped sales infrastructure for agricultural products; 
- lack of long-term loans at reasonable interest rates. 
The tasks for the years 2013 -2014: 
- formation of positive long-term expectations of producers by maintaining price stability on key agricultural 
markets; 
- increase in exports of agricultural products and foodstuffs; 
- promotion of innovative technologies in crop production with the aim of import substitution; 
- state financial support and mechanism to encourage the purchase of agricultural machinery of Ukrainian 
production for the formation of modern technological base of agricultural enterprises; 
- stimulation for domestic producers to introduce innovative technologies through modernization in order to 
increase production, improve its quality and substitute import. 
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Annex 3: Simulation of tariff equivalent using different elasticities 
 
Quota Oct. 2006 
- May 2008 
Quota Oct. 2010 
- May 2011 
Export tax 
(simultaneous 
with cancelled 
VAT refund) 
VAT non-re-
imbursement 
July 2011 –Dec. 
2013 
VAT non-re-
imbursement 
after abolition of 
export tax 
Qx 105880.65  [t] 262056.75 587440.50 630938.07 643839.63 
∆Qx -657196.85  [t] -501020.75 -175637.00 -132139.43 -119237.87 
t 
η=0.25 3.44 2.63 0.92 0.69 0.63 
η=0.5 1.72 1.31 0.46 0.35 0.31 
η=0.75 1.15 0.88 0.31 0.23 0.21 
η=1 0.86 0.66 0.23 0.17 0.16 
Note: Calculation based on average monthly wheat export in base period (2009/10 MY) 763077.50 tons. 
